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RELATIONAL THEORY & HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
Jocelyn Down/e* & Jennifer Llewellyn**

1. Introduction
Relational theory starts from an understanding of human selves as relational. This theory informs some significant current developments in the areas of
philosophy, ethics and legal theory that re-envision key concepts including
autonomy, equality, rights, justice, memory, trust, judgment and identity.
In this paper we introduce relational theory and begin to explore some of
its implications for health law and policy. In doing so, we hope to show
the relevance of each field to the other and to persuade those interested in
health law and policy to take up the challenge to pursue the transformative
potential of relational theory through their work.

2. The Project
To thoroughly explore the emerging paradigm of relational theory and how
it can engage with health law and policy, one would have to attend to the
following questions: what is relational theory?; what is the relational conception of the self?; what do identity, memory, judgment, autonomy, equality,
justice, and rights look like through a relational lens? And then one would
have to reflect on what all of this has to do with health law and policy.
Of course, what we have just described is a book and not a paper. In this
paper, we are less ambitious and focus only on a few of the questions asked

Jocelyn Downie, Canada Research Chair in Health Law and Policy; Professor, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Medicine, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Jennifer Llewellyn, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University,
and Director, Nova Scotia Restorative Justice Community University Research
Alliance.
The authors would like to thank Constance Macintosh and the members of the Novel Tech
Ethics Team at Dalhousie University for helpful comments on drafts of this paper.
Such a book project is underway. An edited collection bringing leading relational theorists together with leading scholars in health law and policy is planned
for publication in September 2009.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101762

194

Health Law Journal Special Edition (2008)

above. First, we describe relational theory, paying particular attention to the
central metaphysical concept of the self and focus on one of its derivative
ethical concepts, autonomy. Second, we explore the possible implications
of a relational conception of autonomy for a core issue in health law and
policy, specifically consent to treatment.
We begin with a focus on the concept of the self as it is fundamental
to relational theory. From here we could focus on any of a number of core
values that flow from the concept of the self, for example, autonomy, equality, and justice. However, within the scope of this paper we focus only on
autonomy. This should not be taken to mean that we believe that autonomy
is the most important value to pursue in health law and policy nor that it is
the best lens through which to analyse particular issues in health law and
policy.2 It is reflective merely of the limited space in which we can only to
do justice to one particular value. We chose to focus on autonomy because it
is the most developed concept (beyond the concept of the self) in relational
theory and because it is one of, if not the, dominant concept in health law
and theory. It therefore offers an accessible and illuminating point of entry
into the ultimately, and necessarily, broader conversation. In sum, our goal
is to introduce relational theorists to a field that is ripe for the application
of their work and to introduce health law and policy scholars to a powerful
new paradigm.
Before moving on, it is important to offer some preliminary acknowledgements and caveats.
First, we acknowledge the foundation upon which this paper is built.3
It is quite remarkable how much of the groundbreaking work in relational

2 See, e.g., Sanda Rodgers' arguments in support of viewing state intervention
in relation to reproduction through an equality rather than an autonomy lens.
Sanda Rodgers, "Women's Reproductive Equality and the Supreme Court of
Canada" in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds., Health Law at the Supreme
Court (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2007) 189.
3 See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, "A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care,"
in The Politics of Women's Health: Exploring Agency and Autonomy, The Feminist
Health Care Ethics Research Network, Susan Sherwin, coordinator, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) 19 [Relational Approach}; Christine Koggel,
Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998); Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and
Possibilities" (1989) 1 Yale J. L. & Feminism 7.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101762
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theory has been done by Canadian feminist scholars. We owe them a real
debt and we hope to do their work justice.
Second, we note explicitly that not all relational theory is feminist4 and
not all feminist theory is relational.5 While there is considerable overlap in
the content and authorship between these two theoretical frameworks, they
are not identical. That said, what we present in this paper can be fairly characterized as feminist relational theory. We believe this to be a theoretical
framework with extraordinary potential for health law and policy.
Third, we note that some of the endpoints of the relational approach
might be realized through other theoretical approaches. For example, some
non-relational frameworks also recognize the embodied nature of the self6
and others recognize the need to expand the scope of health law issues from
the physician-patient relationship to oppressive social structures.7 We do not
discount these alternative approaches. Nor do we set out in this paper to argue for relational theory as the superior path to these endpoints. Rather, we
seek to demonstrate the potential fruitfulness of bringing relational theory
together with health law and policy.

3. Relational theory
A literature search on "relational theory", reveals thousands of articles and
books on a dizzying multiplicity of topics: desire and dread; competence;
physical space; capital; leadership; information and learning in social networks; demography; confidentiality; forensic mental health; addiction; authority; genericity; calculus and algebra; knowledge representation; spacetime; emotion; gender; biological systems; behaviour dynamics; datatypes;
public relations; model management; the body; self-organization; corporate
governance; sexuality; computing; database theory; and happiness. Relational theory across all of these topics is grounded in a shared core belief
that the object/subject of attention should be understood in relation to others and as being in relation to others.

4 Examples of non-feminist relational theorists include Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas.
5 Examples of non-relational feminist theorists include Susan Moller Okin, Susan
Wolf, and Martha Nussbaum.
6 See, for example, Elizabeth Grosz and Luce Irigary.
7 See, for example, Susan Wolf and Virginia Held.
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This mass of topics can be organized into clusters that relate to traditional disciplines: physics, mathematics; computer science; business; psychology; anthropology; philosophy; and law. We focus in this paper on philosophy and law as, for obvious reasons, these have the most relevance for
and direct potential impact on health law and policy. In the subspecialities
of philosophy with the most relevance for this project, we find relational
theory playing out in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political and legal
theory, and applied ethics. Metaphysics, for example, asks questions about
the nature of the self, personhood, and identity. Ethics asks questions about
autonomy and equality to name but two core values. Applied ethics takes us
to principles/rules/policies that govern conduct in specific situations, as, for
example, consent and confidentiality.
We turn now to a brief exploration of how relational theory engages the
concepts of self and the implications this has for thinking about the concept
of autonomy.
a. The relational self
To get to the practical implications of relational theory for health law and
policy, we must start with a metaphysical concept, specifically, the concept
of the self. The conception of the self that dominates contemporary Canadian health law and policy is a liberal individualistic one. It is isolated, independent, socially unencumbered, rational, and self-created.8 In contrast,
a relational conception of self is socially connected, interdependent, socially
encumbered, emotional, relationally constructed, socially constituted, and
embodied.9

8 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment? (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959) (1785);
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Peter H. Nidditch ed.,
Ward, Lock & Co., 1982) (1883); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). It must
also be acknowledged that contemporary liberals have attempted to respond to
the communitarian and feminist critiques of the atomistic conception of the self.
See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). However, the dominant version in health law and policy
and bioethics remains the traditional one and so we set the relational concept
up in contrast to that. Also, while some contemporary liberals have moved some
distance from traditional liberalism, they are still not proposing a relational conception of self or autonomy such as will be described in this paper.
9 For a general introduction to the relational self see Catriona Mackenzie and
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It is sometimes easier to convey the concept of the relational self through
expressions that are almost more intuitive than rational in their appeal. So,
in the spirit of relational theory10, we offer the following expressions about
the relational conception of the self:
• We are creatures and creators of our social context.
• We are beings in and of our social context.11
• The self exists in and through relationships.
• Selves are both individuated and integrated.12
• I am because you are (ubuntu) and a person is a person through
persons (umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu).13
• Instead of Descartes' "I think therefore I am", a twenty-first century expression "I am networked therefore I am."14
In sum, a relational self emerges from and is continuously shaped by
the context of multiple relationships with other individuals and institutions
- some of which can promote flourishing and some of which can oppress.

10
11

12
13

14

Natalie Stoljar eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) [Relational Autonomy}. Also see Lorraine Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the
Construction of Knowledge (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1991) ch. 2 "Second
Persons".
See Part 4. a. Competence below for a discussion of the role of rationality in relational theory.
This is a play on the metaphor used to describe the relationship between a pregnant woman and fetus in R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 97
[Sullivan].
D.P. McAdams, "What do we know when we know a person" (1995) 63 J. Personality 365.
See Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Identity, Culture, and Belonging: Religious and
Cultural Rights" in John Witte Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver eds., Religious
Human Rights in Global Perspectives: Religious Perspectives (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) at 527; Gabriel Setiloane African Theology: An Introduction
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1996); Valiant A. Clapper "Ubuntu and
the Public Official" in Publico December 1996 at 27; Lionel Abrahams, "Ubuntu
or not to?" in Sidelines June 1997 at 1.
Kenneth J. Gergen, "The Relational Self in Historical Context" (2006) 1 IJDS
119 at 122.
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b. Relational autonomy
Flowing from the relational conception of the self, various approaches have
been taken to characterizing autonomy as relational.15 Significant attention
has been paid, for example, to what exactly is meant by the claim that the
self is social or relational.16 Feminist scholars have considered the notion
of the social self and it implications in a bid to redeem the notion of autonomy from its traditionally individualistic and rationalistic expression.17
These scholars see the concept of autonomy as worthy of reform because of
its usefulness in the struggle to gain equality and respect for women. They
have thus resisted the urge to reject the concept of autonomy and instead
see it anew through a relational lens. For the purposes of this paper, we offer
the following composite characterization:
Autonomy is the capacity for defining, questioning, revising, pursuing one's interests and goals that is exercised, protected, and corroded within relationships and social structures which together shape
the individual and determine others' responses to her.18

4. From relational theory to health law and policy
What might the implications of a relational conception of autonomy be for
health law and policy? Consider the core issue of consent to treatment. The
traditional approach (grounded in a liberal individualist conception of the
self and of autonomy) focuses on the specific encounter between a patient
and health care provider and requires that, in order for the health care pro-

15 See for example the collection of articles on this topic in Relational Autonomy
supra note 9.
16 See for example Linda Barclay, "Autonomy and the Social Self" in Relational
Autonomy supra note 9 at 52. Barclay identifies and examines three distinct ways
in which the claim for the social self is made through the literature in feminism
and communitarianism. Claims are made for the social self as: deterministic,
motivational, and constitutive. Each of these claims are seen to have different
implications for autonomy.
17 Relational Autonomy, supra note 9 at 3-4.
18 This is a definition from Jocelyn Downie & Susan Sherwin, "A Feminist Exploration of Issues around Assisted Death" (1996) XV St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 303
at 327 [Feminist Exploration], slightly modified in light of the subsequent literature on relational autonomy.
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vider to treat the patient, there must be a consent to treatment made by a
competent individual and that consent must be free and informed.19 To be
adequately informed, the disclosure must meet the informational needs of
a reasonable person in the circumstances of the patient.20 If something goes
wrong and there is a negligence action, the traditional approach to causation
requires that a reasonable and prudent person would not have consented
had they been given the information not provided.
An approach grounded in a relational conception of autonomy can expand our gaze quite dramatically. A relational conception of autonomy will
call on us to revisit the traditional approaches taken to competence, freedom,
disclosure, and reasonableness. It will require us to consider the question of
whether the exercise of autonomy is restricted but also whether the capacity for autonomous decision-making itself is corroded and how it might be
enhanced.22 It will also take us outside the specific encounter between individual patient and individual health care provider and into a much broader
range of points and types of engagement (for example, who should be involved in discussions and decisions as well as how and what social institutions shape the decision or action contexts in which patients and health care
providers are situated).23

19 See, generally, Bernard Dickens, "Medical Negligence" in Jocelyn Downie,
Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy 3rd ed.
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 101; Patricia Peppin, "Informed Consent" in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds., Canadian
Health Law and Policy 3rd ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 189 [Informed Consent}.
20 Reiblv. Hughes, [1980] S.C.J. No. 105, 2 S.C.R. 880 [Reibl].
21 Arndtv. Smith, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 539, 148 D.L.R. (4 th ) 48 [Arndt].
22 Diana Tietjens Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989); Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, "Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed" in Relational
Autonomy, supra note 9, 234.
23 See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, "Whither Bioethics? How Feminism Can Help ReOrient Bioethics" (2008) International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 7 [Whither Bioethics}. There is also an extensive and developing literature
on the role of emotion in law and legal decision making that overlaps in significant and helpful ways with the insights gained from relational theory. For a
helpful overview of the field see: Terry A. Maroney, "Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field" (2006) 30 Law and Human Behaviour
119 [Law and Emotion}.
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a. Competence
Traditionally, health law has seen competence as linked to rationality and
rationality as divorced from what might be characterized as relational decision-making. This has generally disadvantaged women as they have been
more likely to be seen as irrational or driven by their emotions or influenced
by relationships. They have therefore been found by health care providers
and courts to be incompetent and not had their wishes respected.24
At least three issues are at play here in what we call relational decisionmaking.
First, the role of emotion in decision-making.25 When the self is seen as
affective instead of exclusively rational, emotion takes on a legitimate role
in decision-making.26 By way of illustration, think about a decision-making strategy that many readers have likely employed - you have to decide
between two options which will have life-changing import (for example,
choosing between two job offers, deciding whether to stay with or leave a
spouse or whether to have a preventative mastectomy). You imagine yourself as having taken one option and live with that for a day, taking note of
how you are feeling. You then imagine yourself as having taken the other
option and again live with that for a day, again taking note of how you are
feeling about the decision. The decision you actually make is influenced by
the emotional reactions you experienced.
Support for the relational claim that there is an affective component to
competence can also be found in research involving patients with damage
to the part of the brain that processes information about somatic states, conducted by the neurologist Antonio Damasio and considered by legal feminist
Jennifer Nedelsky among others. Damasio found that:

24 Steven H. Miles & Allison August, "Courts, Gender and 'The Right to Die'"
(1990) 18 Law Med. & Health Care 85.
25 There is also an extensive and developing literature on the role of emotion in
law and legal decision making that overlaps in significant and helpful ways with
the insights gained from relational theory. For a helpful overview of the field
see: Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion, supra note 23.
26 See, Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Susan Sherwin, Relational Approach, supra note 3; Nedelsky,
"Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) McGill LJ 91 [Embodied Diversity].
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what the experience with patients ... suggests is that the cool strategy advocated by Kant, among others, has far more to do with the
way patients with prefrontal [brain] damage go about deciding than
with how normals usually operate.27
Nedelsky summarized Damasio's theory as follows:
effective reasoning requires what he calls "somatic markers". Somatic markers are emotional responses that (for the most part) we
have learned, through experience, to associate with certain images.
When, in deciding what to do, one imagines a certain action, one associates it with an outcome, which triggers an emotional reaction.28
The second aspect of relational decision-making to consider is the practice of attending to the preservation of relationships. Here the work of Carol
Gilligan and many of those who followed her in the development of what
has come to be known as an ethic of care becomes particularly relevant.29
Consider the following illustration of two types of reasoning from a psychological study conducted by D. Kay Johnston30 in which children were asked
to respond to the following fable:
It was growing cold, and a porcupine was looking for a home. He
found a most desirable cave but saw it was occupied by a family of
moles.
"Would you mind if I shared your home for the winter?" the porcupine asked the moles.

27 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New
York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994) at 172.
28 Nedelsky, Embodied Diversity, supra note 26 at 102.
29 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond Gender
Difference to a Theory of Care" (1987) 12:4 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 644.
30 D. Kay Johnston, "Adolescents' solutions to dilemmas in fables: Two moral orientations - Two problem solving strategies" in Carol Gilligan, et al., eds. Mapping
the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988) 49.
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The generous moles consented and the porcupine moved in. But the
cave was small and every time the moles moved around they were
scratched by the porcupine's sharp quills. The moles endured this
discomfort as long as they could. Then at last they gathered courage
to approach their visitor.
"Pray leave," they said, "and let us have our cave to ourselves once
again."
"Oh no!" said the porcupine. "This place suits me very well"
Ethic of justice responses included - "The porcupine has to go definitely.
It's the mole's house," "It's their ownership and nobody else has the right
to it" or "Send the porcupine out since he was the last one there." Ethic of
care responses, in contrast, included - "The both of them should try to get
together and make the hole bigger" and "Wrap the porcupine in a towel."
Contemporary relational theory has distanced itself from various aspects of
the ethics of care (e.g., the failure to acknowledge the oppressive nature of
some relationships, the stark juxtaposition of care and justice, and the extent
of gender difference claimed). However, it retains a modulated belief in the
legitimacy of attending to the preservation of relationships in competent
decision-making.
A third aspect of relational decision-making is the inclusion of intimates
in the process of decision-making. While having family present during a consent process is certainly common in contemporary health care, when family
members exert what is characterized as too much influence in the process,
questions of competence and voluntariness may be raised. The liberal individualist model cannot comprehend a competent individual believing that
another person should have decision-making authority for their treatment
decisions. A relational model can entertain a wider range of possible levels
and kinds of decisional authority-shifting without concluding that the individual is incompetent and the consent therefore invalid.
A relational conception of autonomy allows us to see emotion and relational reasoning as legitimate aspects of competence. It suggests that that
health law, policy, and practice should see and treat as competent a wider
range of decision-makers and decision-making than they do at present.

31 Ibid, at 71.
32 Supra note 30 at 53.

Downie & Llewellyn Health Law and Policy

203

b. Freedom
Autonomy and consent take us not just to the issue of competency but also
to the issue of freedom. Traditionally, health law has considered a decision to
be free if it is made without external forces directly interfering with a choice
between the options in front of the individual; no arm twisting, no guns to
heads, no vast sums of money dangled in front of the person. Unfortunately,
this approach loses sight of other important barriers to freedom as well as the
conditions necessary to support freedom.
A relational approach surfaces the fact that there are not just external
direct forces but also internal and indirect forces that must be attended to
and resisted where restrictive or corrosive and promoted where enhancing.
By forces indirectly interfering with choice we mean "forces that limit
the set of options and thereby interfere with choice."33
By internal forces interfering with choice we mean "a person's own desires that are grounded in the perceptions of herself and her options that
have been oppressively constructed through socialization in such a way that
the person does not accurately perceive herself or her options."34
Consider some concrete health law examples:
External direct forces - a twenty-three-year-old man is physically forced
into a psychiatric facility for treatment of his schizophrenia.
External indirect forces - a pregnant teenager has recently moved from
Quebec to Nova Scotia. She can only get an abortion if she pays up front and
claims the funds back from Quebec.35 Abortion is not illegal so there are no
external direct forces preventing her from having an abortion but she does
not have the necessary funds.36
Internal direct forces - a 5'6" 140 pound woman appears at the surgeon's office seeking gastric bypass surgery citing the same reasons that she
used previously for breast implants, cheek implants, botox treatments, rhinoplasty, calf implants, and liposuction.37

33 See, e.g., Jocelyn Downie & Susan Sherwin, Feminist Exploration, supra note 18;
Susan Sherwin, Relational Approach, supra note 3.
34 Jocelyn Downie & Susan Sherwin, Feminist Exploration, supra note 18.
35 Jocelyn Downie & Carla Nassar, "Barriers to Access to Abortion Through a Legal
Lens" (2007) 15 Health Law Journal 143 [Barriers].
36 Ibid.
37 For more on this, see, Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy,
supra note 9.
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Internal indirect forces - a woman appears in her family physician's office. She was sexually abused as a child and is now in an abusive marriage.
She has internalized her father's and partner's denigration of her and cannot
see leaving him as an option open to her.38
Within a traditional liberal individualist framework, the first set of forces
would be acknowledged as a threat to autonomy but the latter three would
not.
To ensure that all decisions in the health arena are free, we must attend
to a wider variety of forces shaped by personal and social relationships than
we have traditionally. Law and policy should require this broader gaze when
assessing the validity of consents in specific cases. It should also consider the
implications for the possibility of voluntary decisions when making policy
that can generate external and internal, direct and indirect forces that limit
or enhance the exercise of autonomy.
c. Disclosure
We turn now to a discussion of the rules with respect to the disclosure required for a valid consent in light of the relational conception of autonomy.
There is a variety of ways in which, on a relational account, the health care
provider may fail to meet adequate disclosure.
First, the discloser may be insufficiently informed because, given the
inequality in the relationship, the patient does not feel empowered to ask
questions of, or provide information to, the physician and so the physician
cannot know what the patient wants to know.
Second, the discloser may be insufficiently informed because he does
not know what he does not know about the patient's relevant circumstances
and so cannot perform his role as discloser sufficiently well. To borrow a
phrase from the "poetry" of Donald Rumsfeld, there are so many "unknown
unknowns"39 lying between many physicians and patients as well as between health lawyers and the people most affected by health law and policy
we help to shape. Many of these unknowns relate to our lack of understanding of the social contexts of others.

38 See, Carolyn McLeod, Self-trust and Reproduction (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002)
[Self-trust].
39 Hart Seely, ed., Pieces of Intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. Rumsfeld
(New York: FREE PRESS, A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2003) at 2.
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A thought experiment involving risk may illuminate this issue. Think
about the issue of disclosure of risk in the context of genetic counselling.
Think about the risk of one-in-180 chance of having a child with a chromosome abnormality at age 35. Picture a patient in front of you to whom you
are about to disclose this risk and imagine the conversation you will have
about risk.
Now consider the following description of a real patient:
a low-income pregnant Afro-Puerto Rican woman in Los Angeles.
She has a 100 percent chance of running out of food stamps this
month, a 25 percent risk of having one son or brother die in street
violence, and an 80 percent chance of getting evicted by the end of
the year.40
Now think back to your previously imagined risk disclosure conversation. Would it still be appropriate for this patient? Of course this is an extreme and non-local example - deliberately so. The point is that we need to
be forced outside ourselves in thinking about disclosure.
We can fairly easily put ourselves in the shoes of the patient and think
(using the facts from Reibl v. Hughes which will be more familiar to most
readers than the facts in our thought experiment) "oh, I should ask whether
he has plans to retire in a few months such that he could wait for the surgery and not risk his pension."41 But, in doing so, we are putting ourselves

40 This example is taken from Angela Thachuk, "Midwifery, Informed Choice, and
Reproductive Autonomy: A Relational Approach" (2007) 17 Feminism & Psychology 39.
41 In Reibl v. Hughes, a 44-year old Hungarian immigrant, Mr. Reibl, elected to undergo a surgical procedure to remove an occlusion in an artery near his brain
that was preventing blood flow through the artery. Dr. Hughes, a competent
neurosurgeon, performed the surgery successfully. Shortly thereafter, Mr Reibl
suffered a massive stroke resulting in the paralysis of his entire right side. In
the absence of the surgery, the risk of stroke had not been imminent, however
Dr. Hughes did believe that Mr. Reibl's chances of suffering a stroke would be
greater if he did not undergo the procedure. Prior to the surgery, Dr. Hughes
explained the risks of the procedure to Mr. Reibl including the risk of death or
stroke, but Mr. Reibl did not understand those risks, and claimed that he would
not have gone ahead with the surgery if he understood them, especially because
he was only one and a half years away from being eligible to receive his pension. The issue for the Supreme Court of Canada concerned Dr. Hughes' liability
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(with all our privilege as we have jobs to retire from and we have pensions
ahead of us) in the shoes of the patient. Instead, we must see the patients in
their own shoes. Most importantly, we must not fail to appreciate the aspects
of their lives that relate most oppressively to their social situatedness (e.g.,
class, race, gender, disability).
We need to explore the "unknown unknowns." We need to build much
greater awareness into our disclosure rules and practices. We need to explore different and greater obligations for health care providers to inquire
prior to the disclosure. This may, for example, shift the power imbalance
(as the physician seeks information that the patient has and therefore indirectly gives the patient more power). This may increase the chances that the
health care provider will understand what patients actually need to know.
Finally, if it results in broadening what health care providers typically ask
about, it may avoid stereotypes resulting in missed information (e.g., the
physician assuming that a pregnant, wealthy, white woman is not abusing
drugs or subject to violence in her home).
Third, there are also times when a health care provider knows what
is relevant to the patient and is prepared to disclose all the relevant information that she has to the patient but is lacking information as a result of
health law, policy, and practice. For example, it is well documented that
there are gaps in knowledge about the safety and efficacy of cardiac care for
women and the use of antidepressants in African Canadians.42 Even in the
recent past, health care professionals did not have the relevant information
because the research wasn't done to determine subgroup differences. Treatments shown to work and be safe for white males were applied (sometimes
detrimentally) to women, visible minorities, etc. On an ongoing basis, those
setting much of the research agenda are focusing on the market and therefore on issues for wealthy white men. Those in charge of the policies that
impact on the setting of the research agenda appear to be unaware of, or
insensitive to, the ways in which the setting of the research agenda is leading to significant gaps in knowledge and thereby resulting in insufficiently
informed disclosures (and thereby compromising consent). Clearly, consid-

for failure to meet the requisite standard of disclosure for informed consent.
Reibl, supra note 20.
42 Francpise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie, & Susan Sherwin, "Refraining Research Involving Humans" in The Politics of Women's Health: Exploring Agency and Autonomy,
The Feminist Health Care Ethics Research Network, Susan Sherwin, coordinator, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) 234.
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ering disclosure through a relational lens, we must assess law and policy for
its impact on what health care providers will have available to them to disclose in encounters with patients (particularly where the lack of knowledge
disproportionately affects those in society who are already disadvantaged by
social structures and institutions).
d. Reasonable person in the circumstances of the patient
In traditional consent law, we look at what the reasonable person in the
circumstances of the patient would want to know and what the reasonable
person in the circumstances of the patient would have decided had she been
given a particular piece of information before consenting to what ended up
being a harmful treatment.43
Much criticism has been levied against the modified objective test and
the reasonable person standard.44 We will not rehearse those criticisms here.
What we will do, however, is simply point out that the preceding discussion
of the role of rationality vs. emotion in decision-making and the role of relational reasoning will apply here too. For example, it seems misguided to
allow for rational fears but never irrational (and yet authentic) fears.45
We also want to explore briefly another feature of decision-making that
can arise from the relational conception of the self and can challenge/enrich
our approach to causation analysis. That is, the role of the interests of others
in our decision-making. A traditional approach takes self interest and the
interests of others as being entirely distinct. One might choose to privilege
the interests of others (particularly those close to us) over oneself but it is a
form of self-sacrifice (and cannot, "reasonably", be taken too far).
However, a relational approach could posit that the interests of others
(at least some others) are inextricably linked up with our interests.46 That is,
there is no stark self/other interest distinction. Rather, the interests of some
others are included in/constitutive of my own interests - self-other interest.

43 Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] S.C.J. No. 57, 2 S.C.R. 192; Reibl, supra note 20; Arndt, supra
note 21.
44 See, e.g. Patricia Peppin, Informed Consent, supra note 19; Vaughan Black & Elaine
Gibson, The Temporal Element of Informed Consent Afshar v. Chester (2004)13
Health L. Rev. 36.
45 Arndt, supra note 21.
46 Franchise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, "An Ethical and Criminal Law Framework
for Research Involving Children in Canada" (1993) 1 Health L. J. 39.
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A person's interests are in part constituted by the interests of others. This
transforms what could be seen as self-sacrifice to self-interest. This approach
could lead one to accept the claim that someone would have reasonably
made a decision that would be seen as unreasonable or imprudent on a
more traditional dichotomous view of self/other interests.
e. Corrosion of capacities essential to autonomy
Of course, we need to ask whether law, policy, or practice are placing limits
on the exercise of autonomy in any particular situation. We tend to do that,
to a limited extent, quite well. However, we also need to ask whether law,
policy, or practice are corroding the capacity for autonomous decision-making. Consider, for example, the issue of forced treatment of women with addictions and histories of abuse. This issue is frequently pitched as a conflict
between restricting the exercise of choice of a woman and protecting her
health. But it should also be analyzed in terms of the effect of such mandatory treatment on the woman's capacity for autonomy. As noted by Sue
Sherwin and Carolyn Macleod:
Forcing them into treatment that will probably be ineffective (since
coerced treatment typically is ineffective) will have the likely consequence of further undermining their already limited autonomy.
Imposing treatment will increase the powerlessness of these addicts
because all that it achieves is a further reduction in their decisionmaking power. Taking this power away from them in the context
of treatment for their addictions could only be justified if the intent
and the most probable consequence of doing so would be to improve their level of autonomy in the long run. Ineffective treatment
would not have this consequence, and thus, for addicts with low
self-trust, it is especially urgent that means other than coercion be
sought to encourage them to escape from the compulsive nature of
their addictions.47
Because they are alienating or blind to the relational nature of the self,
particular practices can rob individuals of traits that relational theorists such
as Diana Meyers have argued are necessary for autonomy - self-knowledge,

47 Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy, supra note 9.
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self-definition, self-direction,48 and the additional trait added by Carolyn
MacLeod - self-trust.49 Health law and policy needs to be alert to such practices and respond to them with appropriate instruments designed to enhance
rather than allow the corrosion of relational autonomy. This, of course,
would take us well into the arena of law and policy relating to education,
violence, poverty, and the many other social determinants of health.50

Conclusion
We hope that we have described a new paradigm and given the reader some
concrete illustrations of how embracing that new paradigm might play out
in relation to a specific health law and policy context. More globally, we
hope that we have illustrated that embracing relational theory will take us
to new questions, new answers to old questions, and new priorities for our
work. In sum, that it can enrich and transform health law and policy.
If we have piqued your interest (and to take you beyond the narrow
confines of autonomy), we would point you to: Sue Campbell's work on
memory and its implications for the use of false memory syndrome evidence in sexual abuse cases as well as her work on privacy and its implications for the disclosure of medical records in sexual assault cases51; Christine Koggel's work on equality52 and its implications for, for example, the
dignity step in s.15 analysis for an equality claim regarding abortion access;
and Jennifer Llewellyn's work taking a relational lens on equality in the
context of allocation of health resources.53 We would also encourage you

48 Diana Tietjens Meyers, "Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!" in Relational Autonomy, supra note 9, 151.
49 Carolyn McLeod, Self-trust, supra note 38.
50 Susan Sherwin, Whither Bioethics, supra note 23.
51 See, e.g. Sue Campbell, "Relational Remembering: Suggestibility and Women's
Confidential Records" in Christine M. Koggel, Allannah Furlong & Charles
Levin Confidential Relationships: Psychoanalytical, Ethical (9- Legal Contexts (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2003) 151.
52 Christine M. Koggel, "Confidentiality in the Liberal Tradition: A Relational Critique" in Christine M. Koggel, Allannah Furlong & Charles Levin Confidential
Relationships: Psychoanalytical, Ethical & Legal Contexts (Amsterdam/New York:
Rodopi, 2003) 113.
53 Jennifer Llewellyn, "A Healthy Conception of Rights? - Thinking Relationally
About Rights in a Health Care Context" in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson,
eds., Health Law at the Supreme Court (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2007) 57.
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to take up this challenge - take the relational conception of self, reflect on
its implications for the core value of autonomy as well as other core values
such as equality and justice, go to your own areas of expertise in health law
and policy, and reflect on and write about the implications and power of
relational theory.

